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Part 1: The Basic Inconsistency of German Affricates 
in Wurzel's approach 
Abstract 
Linguistics lacks clear methodological guidelines which could be made use of when-
ever one faces a contradiction. The basic inconsistency of German affricates provides 
an instructive example of the problems emerging from this situation. This paper 
aims to reveal why Wurzel's eclectic framework, applying both notions of structura-
list phonology and SPE, yields an irresolvable inconsistency. CV phonology raised 
the hope that the latter could be void of the shortcomings characterising earlier ap-
proaches. The continuation of this paper, Rákosi (2014) will be devoted to the analy-
sis of Prinz & Wiese's (1991) approach. 
Keywords: inconsistency, affricates, SPE, structuralist phonology, p-model 
1 Introduction  
Cases in which an inconsistency is found to be irresolvable within a 
theoretical framework while it is solvable with the help of another 
theory are well-known to every linguist. It goes without saying that 
following clear methodological guidelines would be essential when-
ever one faces a contradiction variously labelled as an "exception" or 
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"counter-example" and the like. Unfortunately, the nature of incon-
sistency in linguistics has not been studied at all so far and, accord-
ingly, at present there are no generally known methodological tools 
at our disposal which could be relied on when one has to cope with 
contradictions. However, due to the well-known pluralism of linguis-
tics and the conflicting interests of the social groups propagating par-
ticular approaches, analysing the treatment of inconsistency in cur-
rent theories would inevitably compel us to take sides in present-day 
theoretical quarrels and thus blur the general methodological issue. 
Therefore, it seems to be reasonable to make the first step toward the 
clarification of the nature of inconsistency in linguistics by analysing 
merely historical examples and thus distance our analysis from the 
'wars' between current linguistic theories. Having thus found an ap-
propriate point of departure, later on, as a next step, the moral of the 
historical examples can be applied directly to the evaluation of cur-
rent theories as well as to the task of deciding between them. 
In order to illustrate the issue we have just mentioned, in this pa-
per we will present a case study on the phonological structure of 
German affricates. The phonological problem that German affricates 
raise is relatively simple; therefore it can serve as a clearly under-
standable and instructive example of particular aspects of the treat-
ment of contradictions in linguistics.  
Affricates in German are phonetically bisegmental, because they 
consist of a plosive and a fricative. However, their phonological sta-
tus is problematic: Are they single units or two-member consonant 
clusters? Accordingly, the literature on this question is burdened 
with the following contradiction: 
 
(I) (a) Phonologically, German affricates are equivalent to single 
consonants.  
(b) Phonologically, German affricates are equivalent to conso-
nant combinations. 
 
(I) is the basic inconsistency of German affricates. 
There was consensus in the seventies and eighties that it cannot 
be the case that an element of the phoneme system behaves as a sin-
gle segment and a segment cluster at the same time. Accordingly, the 
properties biphonemic and monophonemic were regarded as mutually 
exclusive. In this vein, Wurzel (1981) interpreted (I)(a) and (b) as mu-
tually exclusive alternatives between which a decision has to be 
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made. In contrast, Prinz and Wiese adopt a different stance on this 
inconsistency. They are of the opinion that Wurzel's strategy is in-
herently mistaken. They argue that both members of (I) should be 
maintained because 
[F]rom a phonotactic point of view, affricates are equivalent to single conso-
nants, while segmentally, they are combinations of segments (Prinz & Wiese 
1991: 168; our translation).1 
This kind of state of affairs is typical in linguistics: it is often the case 
that if no decision can be made between two rival hypotheses, then a 
new theoretical framework is proposed which separates the two con-
flicting statements by assigning them to different levels of represen-
tation. Despite the basic, everyday character of such situations, the 
logical background and the methodological tools related to such a res-
olution of inconsistencies in linguistics are anything but clear.  
Therefore, we will raise the following problem: 
 
(P) (a) Why is the basic inconsistency of German affricates irre-
solvable within Wurzel's approach? 
(b) Does it become solvable within Prinz and Wiese's approach? 
(c) Do the answers to (P)(a) and (P)(b) suggest generalisable 
methodological guidelines that may be applicable to the fu-
ture treatment of inconsistency in linguistic theorising? 
 
The structure of this paper will be as follows. Section 2 outlines the 
central concepts of a metatheoretical model which enables us to re-
construct and to evaluate the authors’ attempts at the resolution of 
the inconsistency between (I)(a) and (b). In Section 3, Wurzel's argu-
mentation will be analysed in order to find a solution to (P)(a). Rákosi 
(2014) will be devoted to (P)(b) and (P)(c).  
2  The p-model of plausible argumentation  
The basic idea of the p-model of plausible argumentation is that the 
structure of linguistic theories is based on various techniques of plau-
sible argumentation. Such an approach has been put forward in Ker-
                                               
1  Prinz & Wiese's (1991) approach has precursors, such as Clements & Keyser 
(1983) and Wiese (1988). 
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tész & Rákosi (2012).2 In the next paragraphs we briefly summarise 
those fundamental principles which are crucial for the understanding 
of the reconstructions presented in Sections 3 and 4; for their com-
prehensive discussion see Kertész & Rákosi (2012).  
 
(i) Plausible statements. In most cases our hypotheses are not state-
ments the truth of which is guaranteed. Rather, they are more or less 
plausible statements: we are ready to accept them to some extent on 
the basis of sources that support them.3 Plausibility is gradual and 
strongly source-dependent. A statement may be very plausible accord-
ing to one source, and less plausible with respect to other sources. It 
may also happen that some sources support the negation of the given 
statement and make it implausible. Further, if several sources support 
a statement, then its plausibility value is higher on the basis of all 
sources together than its plausibility value on the basis of any of the 
sources alone. It is also possible that neither a statement nor its nega-
tion is made plausible by a source; in such cases, we speak of neutral 
plausibility on the basis of the given source.  
Plausibility can be represented numerically. These values merely 
indicate different relative strengths of reliability, supportedness, or ac-
ceptance within a theory (i.e., the argumentation process). Therefore, 
their manipulation cannot be described with the help of a logical cal-
culus, it is more rudimentary. The plausibility value of statement p on 
the basis of the source S is such that: 
 
|p|S = 1, if p is true with certainty on the basis of S;  
|p|S = 0, if p is of neutral plausibility on the basis of S;  
0  |p|S  1, if p is plausible on the basis of S. 
 
(ii) Plausible inferences. Deductive inferences the premises of which 
are true with certainty secure the truth of their conclusion. However, 
typically either there is no logical consequence relation between the 
premises at our disposal and the conclusion we want to arrive at, or 
                                               
2  This approach has been motivated by the ideas of George Polya and Nicholas 
Rescher (cf. e.g. Polya 1948, 1954; Rescher 1976, 1987), and prepared e.g. in Ker-
tész (2004) and Kertész & Rákosi (2006, 2009). 
3  Such ‒ more or less reliable ‒ sources are in linguistics, for example, corpora, 
theories, conjectures, the intuition of native speakers, experiments, fieldwork, 
historical documents, dictionaries, videotapes, and inferences (cf. Rescher 1976: 
6f.; Rescher 1973: 63ff., Kertész & Rákosi 2012: 63ff.). 
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at least one of the premises is, instead of being certainly true, only 
plausible in the light of the given sources. Although both of these 
cases may occur separately, it is in combination that they are most 
frequent. In such situations, we can make use of plausible inferences. 
Plausible inferences are capable of making their conclusion plausible 
– but not true with certainty – on the basis of the content and plau-
sibility value of their premises. Whether an inference is capable of 
fulfilling this task cannot be decided easily: besides logical considera-
tions, a series of informal (content-related and context-related) fac-
tors have to be taken into consideration. For instance, if there is no 
logical consequence relation between the premises and the conclu-
sion, then latent background assumptions are also needed, and these 
have to be plausible or at least not known to be implausible or false 
with certainty. In such inferences the connection between the prem-
ises and the conclusion cannot be reduced to the relationship between 
their logical structures but always rests on a semantic relation such 
as causality, analogy, similarity, sign, necessary or sufficient condi-
tion, part-whole relation etc. 
(iii) The p-context. The p-context covers pieces of information 
which are relevant in conducting the argumentation process. It in-
cludes the sources in terms of which the plausibility value of state-
ments can be judged, as well as a set of statements together with 
their relevant characteristics such as their plausibility values with 
respect to the sources in the p-context and their logical and semantic 
structure. The methodological tools related to the components of the 
p-context (for instance, the strategies of the resolution of inconsisten-
cies, the methods for judging the reliability of the sources etc.) and 
the criteria of their usage also belong to the p-context.  
(iv) The informational over- and underdetermination of the p-con-
text. In a p-context the sources may yield too much information in the 
sense that there is a statement which is made plausible by some 
source while its negation is made plausible by another. In such cases, 
the p-context is informationally overdetermined (Rescher 1976: 2, 
Rescher & Brandom 1980: 3ff.), and the set of the plausible state-
ments in the p-context is p-inconsistent. Nevertheless, the p-context 
may be informationally underdetermined as well (Rescher & Bran-
dom 1980: 3ff.). A typical case of the informational underdetermina-
tion of the p-context is its p-incompleteness, insofar as there are 
statements which are neither plausible (in the extreme case: true 
with certainty) nor implausible (in the extreme case: false with cer-
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tainty) with respect to any source given. A p-context may be simulta-
neously informationally under- and overdetermined.  
(v) The concepts of data and evidence. P-inconsistency and p-in-
completeness often arise from situations in which there is conflicting 
evidence or no evidence for a given hypothesis, respectively, in the 
given p-context. In the terminology of the p-model this means the 
following. According to the p-model, data are plausible or certainly 
true statements. In particular, the structure of linguistic data con-
sists of a statement with an information content capturing some 
characteristic of the object of investigation and a plausibility value 
originating from some direct source such as corpora, linguistic intui-
tion, experiments, etc., or from a compound of such sources. A datum 
is evidence for a hypothesis if it is a premise of a plausible inference 
that makes this hypothesis plausible. Similarly, a datum is evidence 
against a hypothesis if it is a premise of a plausible inference that 
makes this hypothesis implausible. Thus, p-inconsistency emerges if 
certain data provide evidence for a statement but other data provide 
evidence against it. P-incompleteness may result from the lack of 
data that could serve as evidence for or against a certain statement. 
(vi) Problems, their solution and their resolution. We call instances 
of informational over- or underdetermination p-problems. If a p-con-
text is characterised by over- and/or underdetermination, then it is 
called p-problematic. In order to solve a problem, we have to re-eval-
uate the p-context by revising its elements (see (viii) on this). A solu-
tion of a p-problem is achieved if a p-context has been arrived at in 
which either (a) the statement in question is unanimously supported 
or opposed by the sources, that is, it is either plausible or implausible 
on the basis of all sources in the given p-context, or (b) the state-
ments generating p-inconsistency can be represented in such a way 
that they become separated systematically and this separation is 
well-motivated.  
It is possible that a problem has several solutions. The resolution 
of a p-problem is a solution of the given problem which is, when com-
pared with other solutions, the best according to a set of criteria ac-
cepted as well as the information available to us.  
(vii) Plausible argumentation. To achieve the solutions or the res-
olution of a given p-problem, we need a heuristic tool that enables us 
to re-evaluate the p-context. This heuristic tool is what we will call 
plausible argumentation. In simple terms, plausible argumentation is 
the transformation of a p-problematic p-context into one which is no 
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longer (or at least, less) problematic. This involves the successive re-
evaluation of a problematic p-context by the elaboration of possible 
solutions to its p-problems, the evaluation of the alternative solutions 
and the comparison of the latter. Its aim is the detection of all avail-
able solutions and the decision as to which of them is to be accepted 
as the resolution of the given p-problem.  
(viii) The cyclic nature of plausible argumentation. The above 
characterisation of plausible argumentation indicates that the argu-
mentation process is basically not linear, because the re-evaluation of a 
problematic p-context usually does not lead immediately to an un-
problematic one but may raise new problems. This may require the 
revision of previous decisions or the assessment of other alternatives etc. 
Therefore, throughout the argumentation process one returns to the 
problems at issue again and again, and re-evaluates the earlier deci-
sions about the acceptance or rejection of statements, the reliability 
of the sources, the plausibility values of the statements, the work-
ability of methodological norms, the conclusions previously reached 
by inferences etc. In sum: one retrospectively re-evaluates the infor-
mation at one's disposal (cf. Rescher 1976, 1987). Thus, retrospective 
re-evaluation is cyclic in nature. Of course, cyclic returns are also pos-
sible within an argumentation cycle. If one is not satisfied with the ful-
filment of some step during the current cycle in the face of the infor-
mation obtained in a later stage, then one may start a sub-cycle.  
(ix) The prismatic nature of plausible argumentation. Plausible ar-
gumentation is not only cyclic, it is also prismatic. This means that the 
cycles continuously change the perspective from which the pieces of in-
formation constituting the p-context are evaluated (cf. Rescher 1987). 
In this way, one modifies the p-context again and again and – if no reso-
lution of the initial p-problem is achieved – sets up new, re-evaluated 
versions of it. Thus, the newer and newer argumentation cycles grad-
ually elaborate diverse constellations of statements, plausibility val-
ues, sources, and methodological principles etc., i.e., rival solutions. 
(x) Problem solving strategies. A constitutive characteristic of plau-
sible argumentation is that usually the re-evaluation of the p-context 
cannot be complete. There are often practical limits that do not allow 
us, for example, to take every source of the starting p-context into 
consideration, to produce and evaluate all information potentially in-
herited by them, or to perform a complete test of inconsistency during 
the coordination of the p-context etc. Therefore, one has to rely on 
problem-solving strategies that are capable of ensuring that the ar-
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gumentation process takes a relatively comprehensive range of in-
formation into consideration.  
The choice of the problem-solving strategy which can be applied in 
the current state of the elaboration of the p-context requires the use 
of heuristic considerations as well, because there are no exact criteria 
which would allow one to determine which perspective has to be 
taken in a given situation. Basically, one can choose between three 
strategies for treating p-inconsistency:  
 
– The Contrastive Strategy. The essence of this strategy is that it 
develops p-context version germs in such a way that it treats the 
p-context versions containing the contradictory statements as ri-
val alternatives. That is, one aims at reaching a decision between 
them on the basis of the information at one's disposal.  
– The Exclusive Strategy. This strategy is applied after the Contras-
tive Strategy when a decision has been reached between the two 
rival p-context versions elaborated. It aims at checking as com-
prehensively as possible whether the p-context version chosen 
can be extended in such a way that it is capable of explaining 
phenomena that could be accounted for within the rejected p-con-
text version. This, of course, may lead to the emergence of new p-
problems. 
– The Combinative Strategy. This strategy consists in treating the 
two rival p-context versions not as rivals but as two parts of a 
whole that have to be maintained simultaneously. The two co-
existing p-context versions making up the whole p-context have 
to be gradually elaborated. In such cases, one has to try to elabo-
rate two unproblematic p-context versions. If one succeeds, then 
the initial p-problem is solved by the simultaneous but system-
atically separated maintenance of the two rival p-context ver-
sions. Nevertheless, it is essential to check whether the separa-
tion of the two p-context versions is well-motivated.  
 
(xi) The logical background of the problem solving strategies. Classi-
cal logic cannot explain how it is possible that there are scientific 
theories that contain contradictions but are fully functional. To wit, 
according to classical logic, anything follows from contradictory 
premises. Therefore, inconsistencies are seen to lead to logical chaos 
and are deemed to be intolerable. 
In the second half of the twentieth century several attempts were 
made to develop non-classical logics in which it is not the case that 
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anything follows from a pair of contradictory statements. More pre-
cisely, let  be the relation of logical consequence.  is explosive if 
and only if for every statement A and B, {A, ~A}  B, where '~' stands 
for the logical constant of negation. Classical logic is explosive. A logic 
is said to be paraconsistent if and only if its relation of logical conse-
quence is not explosive. (For recent surveys see, for example, Priest 
2002a,b, Meheus (ed.) 2002, Priest et al. (eds.) 2004, Priest & Tanaka 
2009, Tanaka et al. (eds.) 2013 etc.). In the current literature it is 
generally acknowledged that some version of paraconsistent logic is 
inevitable whenever one deals with inconsistency.  
The most natural extension of the p-model’s inventory presented 
seems to be Rescher & Brandom's (1980) paraconsistent logic. Its 
basic idea is that Kripke-style semantics is modified in such a way 
that one cannot draw inferences from premises which belong to dif-
ferent possible worlds. Thus, if A and ~A are separated from each 
other into different possible worlds, then they are harmless and do 
not lead to logical chaos.4 
 
Having introduced the p-model as a metatheoretical framework, in 
the next section we will apply it to the metatheoretical reconstruction 
of Wurzel's analysis of German affricates. 
 
 
3 On (P)(a) 
3.1 The reconstruction of Wurzel's (1981) attempt to 
solve the contradiction (I)(a) and (b) 
Wurzel considers only the affricates [ts] and [pf] and, accordingly, (I) 
is made more specific in that it is retrospectively re-evaluated as (IW):  
 
(IW) (a) The German affricates [ts] and [pf] are monophonemic. 
(b) The German affricates [ts] and [pf] are biphonemic. 
 
In the terminology of the p-model this means that Wurzel (1981) ap-
plies the Contrastive Strategy (see (x) in Section 2): he deems (IW)(a) 
and (b) as rival alternatives between which a decision has to be made. 
                                               
4  For details, see Rescher & Brandom (1980), Kertész & Rákosi (2013: Section 3.2). 
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In order to come to a decision between (IW)(a) and (b), Wurzel 
makes use of a series of structural rules in that he examines whether 
the conflicting statements are compatible with these structural rules 
and the relevant data. In other words, he tests whether the given 
data, combined with the structural rules, provide evidence for or 
against (IW)(a) and (b) in the sense of (v) in Section 2. 
 
Cycle 1: The first structural rule (SR1) pertains to possible forma-
tive-initial consonant clusters in German: 
 
(SR1) (a) 0 < |If a vowel /V/ follows a formative-initial /C3C2C1/ 
consonant cluster, then the consonant cluster /C2C1/ also 
occurs in the same position.|W < 1 
(b) 0 < |If a vowel /V/ follows a formative-initial /C2C1/ conso-
nant cluster, then the consonant /C1/ also occurs in the 
same position.|W < 1 
 
(SR1) may be correlated with the phenomenon which Greenberg calls 
'resolvability' and which he describes as follows: "Every initial or final 
sequence of length m contains at least one continuous subsequence of 
length m – 1" (Greenberg 1978: 250). Greenberg emphasises the pro-
viso that although he believes that it applies to a significant majority 
of languages, it does not apply to every language. Moreover, it is sup-
ported only by certain clusters of data even in particular languages, 
allowing for many exceptions. Therefore, this generalisation has, in 
his view, "only statistical validity". Wurzel is aware of the counter-
examples against the structural rules, too. Therefore, (SR1)(a) and (b) 
are plausible but not true with certainty on the basis of Wurzel 
(1981) (abbreviated as W) as a source in the sense of (i) in Section 2. 
Wurzel applies (SR1) to the alveolar affricate [ts] (Wurzel 1981: 
938) and examines whether this rule is compatible with (IW)(a) or 
(IW)(b). He makes use of the following linguistic data:  
 
(D1) (a) 0 < |zwar [tsvɑ:r] ('although') is a German formative.|W < 1 
(b) 0 < |No formative exists with the structure [sv_] in Ger-
man.|W < 1 
(c) 0 < |There exists a formative of the structure [vɑ:_] in 
German, cf. war ('was').|W < 1 
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The statements in (D1) have to be assigned a high plausibility value 
on the basis of Wurzel (1981) as a source; nevertheless, they don't re-
ceive the maximal plausibility value because they contain linguistic 
analysis based on the linguist's linguistic intuition and linguistic 
knowledge as well as generalisation. Wurzel examines the relation-
ship between (SR1) and (IW)(a) and (IW)(b) with the help of (D1)(a) 
and (b). His argumentation can be reconstructed as a series of plau-
sible inferences in the sense of (ii) in Section 2. The first inference 
goes as follows:  
 
(1) 0 < |If the alveolar affricate is biphonemic (= (IW)(b)), then it 
has the phonemic structure /ts/.|W < 1 
0 < |zwar [tsvɑ:r] is a German formative.|W < 1 (= (D1)(a)) 
0 < |If the alveolar affricate has the phonemic structure /ts/, 
and zwar [tsvɑ:r] is a German formative, then the phonological 
representation of the formative zwar will be /tsvɑ:r/.|W < 1  
0 < |If the phonological representation of the formative zwar 
is /tsvɑ:r/, then, according to (SR1)(a), the phoneme cluster 
/sv_/ should also exist in German.|W < 1 
0 < |No formative exists with the structure [sv_] in Ger-
man.|W < 1 (= (D1)(b)) 
0 < |The alveolar affricate is not biphonemic.|(1) < 1 (= 
~(IW)(b)) 
 
This reconstruction shows that inference (1) can be regarded as a 
source that does not prove that (IW)(b) is false but rather, makes 
(IW)(b) implausible. From a logical point of view, this result means 
that the premises of this inference and (IW)(b) cannot be true at the 
same time: the assumption that the alveolar affricate is biphonemic is in 
conflict with the structural rule (SR1) and the relevant linguistic data.  
Then, Wurzel examines the tenability of the opposite assumption 
and checks whether (IW)(a) is consistent with (SR1) and the linguistic 
data with the help of the following plausible inference: 
 
(2) 0 < |If the alveolar affricate is monophonemic (= (IW)(a)), then 
it has the phonemic structure /ts/.|W < 1 
0 < |zwar [tsvɑ:r] is a German formative.|W < 1 (= (D1)(a)) 
0 < |If the alveolar affricate has the phonemic structure /ts/, 
then the phonological representation of the formative zwar 
will be /tsvɑ:r/.|W < 1 
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0 < |If the phonological representation of the formative zwar 
is /tsvɑ:r/, then, according to (SR1)(a), the phoneme cluster /v_/ 
should also exist in German.|W < 1 
0 < |There exists a formative of the structure [vɑ:_] in Ger-
man.|W < 1 (= (D1)(c)) 
0 < |The alveolar affricate is monophonemic.|(2) < 1 (= (IW)(a)) 
 
Confirmation theory5 would interpret (2) in such a way that (IW)(a) 
has become more probable, while according to the p-model, (2) is a 
source on the basis of which one can deem (IW)(a) plausible.6 The rea-
son for the latter claim is that (2) is a plausible inference that is de-
ductively invalid and also requires latent background assumptions in 
order to make the conclusion plausible.7  
From a logical point of view, these findings mean that the set 
{(IW)(a), (SR1), (D1)} is consistent; the relevant data and the first 
structural rule are fully compatible with the hypothesis that the al-
veolar affricate is monophonemic. In the p-models terminology this 
means that the data in (D1) and (SR1) provide evidence (in the sense 
of (v) in Section 2) for (IW)(a) because they make it plausible, and they 
provide evidence against (IW)(b) by making it implausible. 
Figure 1 summarizes the findings we have reached so far: 
                                               
5  Confirmation theory has been popular among philosophers of science and practic-
ing scientists for decades. It has several versions but it also has to face severe 
criticism: 
To say that a body of information is evidence in favour of a hypothesis is to say 
that the hypothesis receives some degree of support or confirmation from that in-
formation. What sorts of information confirm what hypotheses is a question 
which has long been controversial; it was discussed as avidly three centuries 
ago as it is today, when, under the heading of 'confirmation theory', it is one of 
the central topics in contemporary philosophy of science. Its profound interest to 
philosophers is due to its intimate connection with the philosophical problem of 
induction, concerning what grounds, if any, observational data can give us for 
accepting as a basis for action and belief hypotheses whose content logically 
transcends the observational data. Presumably, if it could be shown that any 
such hypothesis is sufficiently well confirmed by the evidence, then that would 
be grounds for accepting it. (Howson 2000: 108; emphasis as in the original) 
6  For the relationship between probability and plausibility, see Kertész & Rákosi 
(2012: 74f.). 
7  For the analysis of this type of inference, see Kertész & Rákosi (2012: Section 9.5). 
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(IW)(a) (IW)(b) 
  
 
(SR1), (D1) (SR1), (D1) 
 
Figure 18 
 
Since no well-founded decision can be based on the application of a 
sole hypothesis, Wurzel extends the p-context with a new hypothesis 
and further data.  
The second structural rule applied by Wurzel is the following 
'mirror-image rule': 
 
(SR2) 0 < |If the phoneme cluster /C1C2_/ occurs formative-initially, 
then there exists a formative in which the phoneme cluster 
/_C2C1/ occurs formative-finally.|W < 1 
 
Wurzel relies on the following set of data: 
 
(D2) (a) 0 < |Pfote [pfo:tə] ('paw') is a German formative.|W < 1 
(b) 0 < |No formative exists with the structure [_fp] in Ger-
man.|W < 1 
(c) 0 < |Pfropfen [pfrɔpfən] ('plug') is a German  
formative.|W <  1 
(d) 0 < |There exists a formative of the structure [_rpf] in 
German, cf. Karpfen ('carp').|W < 1 
 
First, Wurzel checks, with the help of (D2), whether the biphonemic-
ity of the labial affricate is compatible with (SR2). The inference 
drawn by Wurzel can be reconstructed as follows: 
 
(3) 0 < |If the labial affricate is biphonemic (= (IW)(b)), then it has 
the phonemic structure /pf/.|W < 1 
0 < |Pfote [pfo:tə] is a German formative.|W < 1 (= (D2)(a)) 
                                               
8  In Figures 1-13b, double arrows indicate inconsistency, simple arrows indicate 
support. 
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0 < |If the labial affricate has the phonemic structure /pf/, and 
Pfote [pfo:tə] is a German formative, then the phonological 
representation of the formative Pfote will be /pfo:tə/.|W < 1 
0 < |If the phonological representation of the formative Pfote 
is /pfo:tə/, then, according to (SR2), the phoneme cluster /_fp/ 
should also exist in German.|W < 1  
0 < |No formative exists with the structure [_fp] in Ger-
man.|W < 1 (= (D2)(b)) 
0 < |The labial affricate is not biphonemic.|(3) < 1 (= ~(IW)(b)) 
 
The premises of (3) make (IW)(b) implausible instead of providing 
support for it. That is, we have to face p-inconsistency again, since 
the set {(IW)(b), (SR2), (D2)(a)-(d)} turned out to be inconsistent. 
The contrary assumption that the labial affricate has a monopho-
nemic character, however, does not lead to p-inconsistency: 
 
(4) 0 < |If the labial affricate is monophonemic (= (IW)(a)), then it 
has the phonemic structure /pf/.|W < 1 
|Pfropfen is a German formative.|W = 1 (= (D2)(c)) 
0 < |If the labial affricate has the phonemic structure /pf/, and 
Pfropfen is a German formative, then the phonological repre-
sentation of the formative Pfropfen will be /pfrɔpfən/.|W < 1  
0 < |If the phonological representation of the formative 
Pfropfen is /pfrɔpfən/, then, according to (SR2), the phoneme 
cluster /_rpf/ should also exist in German.|W < 1 
0 < |There exists a formative of the structure [_rpf] in 
German.|W < 1 (= (D2)(d)) 
0 < |The labial affricate is monophonemic.|(4) < 1 (= (IW)(a)) 
 
Here again, we obtained that the hypothesis that affricates are 
monophonemic is in harmony with the second structural rule and the 
relevant linguistic data. Thus, the argumentation presented in con-
nection with the structural rule (SR2) has led to the same results as 
with the rule (SR1), because both data sets provide evidence for 
(IW)(a) and against (IW)(b): 
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(IW)(a) (IW)(b) 
  
 
(SR1), (D1) (SR2), (D2) (SR1), (D1) (SR2), (D2) 
 
Figure 2 
 
Therefore, the inferences (3) and (4) reinforced the conclusions of the 
inferences (1) and (2): the plausibility of (IW)(a) and the implausibility 
of (IW)(b) have increased. From a logical point of view this means that 
the supposition of (IW)(a) leads to a consistent set of statements, 
while presuming (IW)(b) leads to a doubly inconsistent set of state-
ments on the basis of the linguistic data and structural rules taken 
into consideration so far.  
These results might tempt us into a decision between (IW)(a) and 
(IW)(b) and suggest keeping (IW)(a) while giving up (IW)(b) as the solu-
tion to this p-problem. This would be, however, premature, since, as 
Wurzel also realizes, the two structural rules also have to be applied 
to the affricates in a reverse order. 
Thus, he employs (SR1) to the labial affricate and, with the help of 
inferences similar to (2) and (4), he obtains that the first structural 
rule is consistent with both (IW)(a) and (IW)(b). In particular, both the 
assumption that the labial affricate is biphonemic and that it is 
monophonemic is in harmony with (SR1) and the following data: 
 
(D3) (a) 0 < |Pflicht [pflɪçt] ('duty') is a German formative.|W < 1 
(b) 0 < |There exists a formative of the structure [fl_] in Ger-
man, cf. flicht (3rd person singular of the verb flechten, 'to 
plait').|W < 1 
(c) 0 < |There exists a formative of the structure [l_] in Ger-
man, cf. Licht ('light').|W < 1 
 
From this it follows that adding (D3) to the p-context version con-
taining (IW)(a) in Figure 2 does not lead to inconsistency, and the 
plausibility of (IW)(a) has risen again. The p-context version around 
(IW)(b), however, has become p-inconsistent because (SR1) and (D3) 
also provide evidence in the sense of (v) in Section 2 for the hypothe-
sis that affricates are biphonemic: 
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 (IW)(a) (IW)(b) 
  
 
  (SR1), (D1)   (SR2), (D2)  (SR1), (D1) (SR2), (D2) 
 
(SR1), (D3)  (SR1), (D3) 
 
Figure 3 
 
Wurzel (1981) also tries to reveal the relationship between the alve-
olar affricate and the mirror-image rule (SR2) with the help of the 
data in (D4): 
 
(D4) (a) 0 < |zehn [tse:n] ('ten') is a German formative.|W < 1 
(b) 0 < |There exists a formative of the structure [_st] in Ger-
man, cf. Nest [nεst] ('nest').|W < 1 
  
With the help of an inference similar to (2) and (4), he comes to the 
conclusion that the assumption that the alveolar affricate is biphonemic 
is consistent with the second structural rule and the data in (D4).  
At this point, let us summarize the results of Wurzel's considera-
tions. As Figure 4 shows, his argumentation in connection with the 
structural rules (SR1) and (SR2) seems to motivate the decision that 
(IW)(b) should be given up and (IW)(a) kept, because the p-context on 
the left is p-consistent while the p-context on the right is p-incon-
sistent: 
 
 
(IW)(a)   (IW)(b) 
  
 
(SR1), (D1) (SR2), (D2) (SR1), (D1) (SR2), (D2) 
 
(SR1), (D3)   (SR1), (D3)       (SR2), (D4) 
 
Figure 4 
 
There are, however, further relevant structural rules which have to 
be taken into consideration such as (SR3): 
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(SR3) 0 < |If the phoneme /v/ precedes a vowel, then it can only occur 
alone or as part of a two-member phoneme sequence.|W < 1 
 
The starting point of Wurzel's argumentation in connection with the 
structural rule (SR3) is the following datum: 
 
(D5) 0 < |zwingen [tsvɪŋən] ('to force') and zwar [tsvɑ:r] ('although') 
are formatives of German.|W < 1 
 
Wurzel's conclusion with respect to (D5) and (SR3) is that the bipho-
nemic character of the alveolar affricate is incompatible with them, 
since in this case, the phoneme /v/ would be preceded by the two con-
sonants /t/ and /s/. In contrast, the assumption that the alveolar as-
sumption is monophonemic, does not lead to a conflict with the third 
structural rule and (D5), because /ts/ has to be regarded as a single 
phoneme.  
If we add these results to our earlier findings, then the picture is 
not altered in comparison to the situation depicted in Figure 4. That 
is, the p-context version around (IW)(a) has remained p-consistent, 
while the p-context version involving (IW)(b) has become even more p-
inconsistent in the sense that the plausibility of (IW)(b) has increased, 
while its implausibility has not been reduced: 
 
 
(IW)(a)   (IW)(b) 
  
 
(SR1), (D1), (D3) (SR2), (D2) (SR3), (D5) (SR1), (D1) (SR2), (D2) 
 
 (SR1), (D3) (SR3), (D5) (SR1), (D3) (SR2), (D4) 
 
Figure 5 
 
The last structural rule applied by Wurzel is the following: 
 
(SR4) 0 < |Not only short vowels, but also long vowels and diph-
thongs may precede a single consonant.|W < 1 
 
Wurzel examines the relationship of this rule to the alveolar and the 
labial affricate with the help of the data in (D6) and (D7), respec-
tively: 
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(D6) 0 < |Mieze [mi:tsə] ('pussycat') and Brezel [bre:tsəl] ('pretzel') 
are formatives of German.|W < 1 
 
(D7) 0 < |There is no formative with the structure [_V1V2pf] in Ger-
man.|W < 1 
 
(SR4) and (D6) are fully consistent with the assumption that the al-
veolar affricate is of a monophonemic nature. With the help of an in-
ference similar to (1) and (3) it is easy to show that the fourth rule 
and the data in (D7) are in conflict with the hypothesis that the labial 
affricate is monophonemic.  
Now, after arriving at the final point of Wurzel's argumentation 
and taking into consideration all four structural rules, we have to re-
alise that the conflict between (IW)(a) and (IW)(b) could not be re-
solved. As Figure 6 shows, both the assumption of (IW)(a) and that of 
(IW)(b) result in a p-inconsistent set of statements (p-context). 
 
 
(IW)(a) (IW)(b) 
  
 
(SR3), (D5) (SR4), (D7)  (SR3), (D5)  
 
(SR1), (D1) (SR2), (D2)  (SR1), (D1) (SR2), (D2) 
 
(SR1), (D3) (SR4), (D6)  (SR1), (D3)  (SR2), (D4) 
 
Figure 6 
 
Thus we can make the substantial claim that both (IW)(a) and (IW)(b) 
have to be regarded as plausible according to certain sources, while 
they seem to be implausible on the basis of other sources. As we have 
seen, there are data which provide evidence for (IW)(a), while other 
data provide evidence against it; and the same can be stated with re-
spect to (IW)(b), although it is clear that in the case of (IW)(a), there is 
only one piece of counter-evidence in the p-context.  
To build up this phonemic system, however, Wurzel has to decide 
whether the affricates will be independent phonemes in the system or 
not. Thus, as a last resort, he still accepts (IW)(a) in his subsequent 
reasoning. (IW)(b) remains part of his approach but he does not use it 
as a premise in later inferences – that is, he isolates this hypothesis 
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from the other hypotheses without eliminating it. This might corre-
spond to the application of the Combinative Strategy in (x) in Section 
2. Nevertheless, the separation of the two rival hypotheses is not 
well-motivated – it remains ad hoc – and Wurzel's proposal cannot be 
deemed to be a well-founded solution of the p-inconsistency (I) in the 
sense of Section 2. Moreover, since in Wurzel's argumentation as re-
constructed above there are several problematic points, it seems to be 
reasonable to start new argumentation cycles in order to find out 
whether Wurzel's argumentation can be retrospectively re-evaluated 
in such a way that one arrives at a solution of (I). Accordingly, in the 
next section we will supplement the above reconstruction by our own 
line of argumentation, keeping within the same phonological frame-
work, in order to find out whether there have been hitherto unre-
vealed possibilities of inconsistency resolution in Wurzel's approach.  
3.2 Additional retrospective re-evaluation of Wurzel's 
argumentation 
Cycle 2: The first criticism we would make of Wurzel's approach is 
that the hypothesised structural rules were not checked against the 
whole domain of the available data. If we examine with respect to 
(SR2), for example, whether Wurzel's investigations conducted in 
Cycle 1 were comprehensive, then we have to conclude that they were 
not. For example, let us consider the following data, whose plausibil-
ity value stems from the present author's linguistic intuition, 
abbreviated as R: 
 
(D8) (a) 0 < |Pflaume [pflaʊmə] ('plum') is a German  
formative.|R < 1 
 (b) 0 < |There exists no formative of the structure [_lpf] in 
German.|R < 1 
 
According to (D8)(a), the phoneme sequence [pfl] can occur formative-
initially, but as is captured by (D8)(b), one cannot find a formative 
with a final [lpf]. If we apply the second structural rule to (D8) by 
supposing (IW)(a), we obtain the following inference: 
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(5) 0 < |If the labial affricate is monophonemic (= (IW)(a)), then it 
has the phonemic structure /pf/.|W < 1 
0 < |Pflaume [pflaʊmə] is a German formative.|R < 1 (= 
(D8)(a)) 
0 < |If the labial affricate has the phonemic structure /pf/, and 
Pflaume [pflaʊmə] is a German formative, then the phonologi-
cal representation of the formative Pflaume will be 
/pflaʊmə/.|R < 1 
0 < |If the phonological representation of the formative 
Pflaume is /pflaʊmə/, then, according to (SR2), the phoneme 
cluster /_lpf/ should also exist in German.|R < 1 
0 < |There exists no formative of the structure [_lpf] in Ger-
man.|R < 1 (= (D8)(b)) 
0 < |The labial affricate is not monophonemic.|(5) < 1 (= 
~(IW)(a)) 
 
This leads, however, to fatal consequences, because neither (IW)(a) 
nor (IW)(b) is consistent with the structural rule (SR2) and the whole 
set of linguistic data: 
 
 
 
(IW)(a) (IW)(b) 
  
 
(SR3), (D5) (SR4), (D6)  (SR3), (D5) (SR2), (D4) 
 
(SR1), (D1) (SR2), (D2)   (SR1), (D1) (SR2), (D2)  
 
(SR1), (D3) (SR2), (D8) (SR1), (D3)  
 
 
Figure 7 
 
This motivates the introduction of a subcycle: we might try to re-
evaluate the p-context in such a way that we give up (SR2). 
  
Subcycle 1: Let us consider the rejection of (SR2). This decision is 
also motivated by the finding that several counterexamples can be 
found against it. For example, as Wurzel (1981: 938) also mentions, 
Twist ('twist'), Schwall ('stream'), quer ('diagonally') are exceptions to 
(SR2).  
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After giving up (SR2), the situation seems to be less problematic. 
However, it is still the case that both (IW)(a) and (IW)(b) are in conflict 
with certain structural rules and data, as Figure 8 shows: 
 
 
(IW)(a)  (IW)(b) 
  
 
  (SR3), (D5) (SR4), (D6)   (SR3), (D5) (D4) 
 
 (SR1), (D1) (D2) (SR1), (D1) (D2)  
 
 (SR1), (D3) (D8) (SR1), (D3)  
 
Figure 8 
 
Another problem with the rejection of (SR2) is that it leads to infor-
mation loss. Namely, none of the rival hypothesis systems obtained in 
Cycle 2, Subcycle 1 are capable of describing the cases in which (SR2) 
functioned properly.  
 
Subcycle 2: There is, however, an alternative solution to this prob-
lem which avoids this deficiency. It is based on the circumstance that 
the exceptions to (SR2) mentioned in Cycle 2, Subcycle 1 have the 
structure /Cv_/, that is, their second consonant is a /v/. Therefore, we 
might try to declare that formatives of the phoneme structure /Cv_/ 
are exceptions to (SR2). Moreover, since /f/ is the voiceless counter-
part of /v/, by analogy formatives with the structure /pf_/ could also 
be regarded as an exception to (SR2). Against this background, if we 
re-introduce (SR2) into our two rival sets of statements with a slight 
modification as (SR2'), the inconsistency of the p-context version 
around (IW)(b) does not increase, while (IW)(a) remains p-inconsistent 
with (D8) and (SR2'): 
 
(SR2') (a) 0 < |If the phoneme cluster /C1C2_/ occurs formative-ini-
tially and C2 is not a /v/ or a /f/, then there exists a forma-
tive in which the phoneme cluster /_C2C1/ occurs forma-
tive-finally.|R < 1 
(b) 0 < |If C2 is a /v/ or a /f/, then the above rule cannot be ap-
plied to the given formative.|R < 1 
 
98 Csilla Rákosi 
Since (SR2') results from a thought experiment that serves solely to 
discover whether its introduction leads to a more satisfactory hypoth-
esis system, the plausibility of both statements in (SR2') is positive 
but rather low on the basis of the source R. After adding (SR2') to 
both p-context versions, the following situation emerges: 
 
 
(IW)(a)  (IW)(b) 
  
 
(SR3), (D5) (SR4), (D6) (SR3), (D5)  (SR2'), (D4) 
 
 (SR1), (D1) (SR2'), (D2) (SR1), (D1) (SR2'), (D2)  
 
(SR1), (D3) (SR2'), (D8) (SR1), (D3)  
 
Figure 9 
 
Subcycle 3: In connection with the conflict between the structural 
rule (SR4), (IW)(a) and (D6), we may try to keep (IW)(a) and give up 
the structural rule (SR4) by declaring the data in (D6) to be counter-
examples against this hypothesis: 
 
 
(IW)(a) (IW)(b) 
  
 
(SR3), (D5) (D6)    (SR3), (D5)  (SR2'), (D4) 
 
(SR1), (D1) (SR2'), (D2)  (SR1), (D1) (SR2'), (D2)  
 
(SR1), (D3) (SR2'), (D8) (SR1), (D3)  
 
 
Figure 10 
 
As Figure 10 shows, we arrive again at a situation in which neither 
(IW)(a) nor (IW)(b) is consistent with all structural rules and linguistic 
data, although (IW)(a) is only in conflict with (SR2') and (D8). There-
fore, still no solution is obtained and further subcycles should be 
started. 
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Subcycle 4: Since (SR3) only rules out possible phoneme structures 
that are also prohibited by (SR1), (SR3) can be deemed to be redun-
dant. Therefore, it can be eliminated without information loss. The 
resulting situation is as in Figure 11: 
 
 
(IW)(a) (IW)(b) 
  
 
(D5) (D6)   (D5) (SR2'), (D4) 
 
(SR1), (D1)  (SR2'), (D2) (SR1), (D1) (SR2'), (D2)  
 
(SR1), (D3)   (SR2'), (D8) (SR1), (D3)  
 
Figure 11 
 
Here again, neither p-context version seems to lead to a satisfactory 
solution. 
 
Subcycle 5: As Figure 11 shows, while (SR1) combined with (D3) 
supports (IW)(b), (SR1) and (D3) provide evidence against it. In order 
to resolve this conflict, we might try to abandon (SR1). This would, 
however, intensify the information loss. Accordingly, a better strategy 
seems to be to modify (SR1) in the following way: 
 
(SR1') (a) 0 < |If a vowel /V/ follows a formative-initial /C3C2C1/ 
consonant cluster and C1 is not a /v/, then the consonant 
cluster /C2C1/ also occurs in the same position.|R < 1 
(b) 0 < |If a vowel /V/ follows a formative-initial /C2C1/ conso-
nant cluster, then the consonant /C1/ also occurs in the 
same position.|R < 1 
 
Thus, we could proceed similarly as in the case of (SR2), since this 
rule has also been modified because of the counterexamples. That is, 
here again certain formatives are declared to be exceptions to a rule. 
As a result, the following constellation would be obtained: 
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(IW)(a) (IW)(b) 
  
 
(D5) (D6)  (D5)     (SR2'), (D4) 
 
(SR1'), (D1) (SR2'), (D2) (SR1'), (D1) (SR2'), (D2)  
 
(SR1'), (D3) (SR2'), (D8) (SR1'), (D3)  
 
Figure 12 
 
As Figure 12 shows, we reached a p-context in which a solution of the 
initial p-problem has been obtained. Namely, it seems to be reasona-
ble to give up (IW)(a) and opt for the biphonemicity of German affri-
cates, because the p-context around (IW)(b) is p-consistent, while that 
around (IW)(a) remained p-inconsistent.  
 
Cycle 3: However, this would mean that a decision has been made on 
the basis of only two structural rules. Moreover, both (SR1') and 
(SR2') rely on the strategy of forbidding the application of rules to 
formatives of a certain structure and maintaining the latter as 
"exceptions", without giving an explanation of the latter's disobedient 
behaviour. Therefore, it might be a rational choice to say that that 
amount of informational underdetermination cannot be tolerated and 
the process of plausible argumentation cannot yet be terminated.  
There are further points as well at which Wurzel's argumentation 
can be re-evaluated. For example, Wurzel set up the conflict between 
the monophonemic and biphonemic character of the labial and the al-
veolar affricate in such a way that he forced a common judgement 
about their mono/biphonemicity. In particular, the only alternatives 
he considered were that both affricates were biphonemic or both were 
monophonemic. There are, however, other combinations possible: it 
may be the case that one of the affricates is biphonemic, while the 
other one is monophonemic. From this it follows that instead of the 
inconsistency between (IW)(a) and (IW)(b), we should start from two 
sets of inconsistencies which can be resolved separately: 
 
(IW1) (a) The German affricate [pf] is monophonemic. 
(b) The German affricate [pf] is biphonemic. 
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(IW2) (a) The German affricate [ts] is monophonemic. 
(b) The German affricate [ts] is biphonemic. 
 
Against this background, for example, the final state of Wurzel's ar-
gumentation can be reconstructed as follows (cf. Figure 6): 
 
 
(IW1)(a) (IW1)(b) 
  
 
 (SR4), (D7)    
 
 (SR2), (D2)  (SR2), (D2) 
 
( SR1), (D3)  (SR1), (D3)  
 
Figure 13a 
 
 
(IW2)(a) (IW2)(b) 
  
 
(SR3), (D5)   (SR3), (D5)  
 
(SR1), (D1)   (SR1), (D1) 
 
 (SR4), (D6) (SR2), (D4) 
 
Figure 13b 
 
As Figure 13b shows, the assumption that the alveolar affricate [ts] 
is monophonemic leads to a consistent hypothesis system. As for the 
labial affricate, however, both the hypothesis that it is biphonemic 
and the assumption that it is monophonemic leads to inconsistency. 
Therefore, we have not reached a solution of the initial p-incon-
sistency. Of course, one may (and should) check the applicability of 
the steps presented in this section in connection with the conflict be-
tween (IW)(a) and (IW)(b) in the case of (IW1)(a)-(b) and (IW2)(a)-(b) as 
well. Thus, a new series of alternatives emerges that also have to be 
analysed and compared. Nevertheless, one has to find a solution to 
(IW1) and (IW2) parallelly, in the sense that the same changes to the 
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given constellation of structural rules and data should be made use of 
with the p-contexts around (IW1)(a), (IW1)(b), (IW2)(a) and (IW2)(b). 
To sum up, our analysis of Wurzel's approach has led to the fol-
lowing conclusions: 
 
 (6) (a) There is no solution-candidate which would be clearly bet-
ter than others; most candidates cannot even be regarded 
as solutions in the sense of (vi) in Section 2. 
 (b) Therefore, the Contrastive Strategy failed in this case. 
(c) A pivotal point of several resolution attempts was the 
reference to "exceptions", which raises problems:  
– Rules are most often supposed to be applicable to all 
cases. Permitting exceptions would mean that they 
could be declared to be inapplicable to a certain range 
of linguistic items.  
– Nonetheless, this strategy is usually judged to be fully 
legitimate if one finds an explanation for the behaviour 
of the disobedient linguistic items. In such cases, their 
separation from the obedient items can be deemed well-
motivated. 
–  In contrast, the application of this strategy without 
such explanations may lead to inconsequentiality: there 
might be cases in which one rejects a hypothesised rule 
because there are counterexamples against it, while in 
other cases one keeps the rule and treats pieces of 
counter-evidence as "exceptions". 
– Nevertheless, if the disobedient cases possess some 
common characteristic, then one might suppose that 
their exceptional behaviour will find an explanation in 
future. Thus, as a last resort, their separation from the 
scope of the rule may be acceptable, and the p-incon-
sistency at issue may be tolerated provisionally. 
(d) The analysis and comparison of the possibilities discussed 
in the previous subsections revealed that inconsistency is 
not the only factor that has to be taken into consideration 
when comparing different hypothesis-constellations:  
– As we have seen in (c), in several cases the p-incon-
sistency was treated in such a way that the "disobedi-
ent" formative structures were declared to be "excep-
tions" to some structural rule and the scope of the rule 
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was restricted to those cases which conform to the rule. 
This strategy is, however, often not satisfactory from a 
linguistic point of view. That is, the decision about the 
acceptability of such solutions goes beyond purely for-
mal considerations. 
– The rejection of a structural rule (or in general: a hypo-
thesis) may lead to a consistent system of accepted 
statements and data but it also causes information loss. 
Namely, the reduced hypothesis system is no longer ca-
pable of accounting for the conforming cases when the 
structural rule could be applied. 
– The structural rules stipulated by Wurzel are based on 
inductive generalisation. Despite their similar origin, 
they do not seem to be equally strong. For example, 
(SR1) appears to be more reliable, and firmer than 
(SR2), (SR3) or (SR4), because it has no counter-exam-
ples and it gets support from a greater amount of posi-
tive examples. 
– The circumstance that Wurzel made use of only a few 
and similar criteria (i.e., "structural rules" based on in-
ductive generalisation) might be regarded as a decisive 
factor in the failure of his approach.  
 
On the basis of these considerations, we came to the conclusion that 
the inconsistency between (I)(a) and (I)(b) cannot be resolved within 
Wurzel's framework. From this, the following solution to (P)(a) pre-
sents itself:  
 
(SP) (a) The basic inconsistency of German affricates is irresolvable 
within Wurzel's approach. This is primarily due to the cir-
cumstance that he relied on a few criteria which were of 
similar origin (inductive generalisation) and related to sim-
ilar aspects of affricates (phonotactics). Since the applica-
tion of these criteria yielded conflicting results, the use of 
the Contrastive Strategy, that is, forcing a decision between 
rival alternatives could not lead to a satisfactory result. 
 
A further important finding was that this failure cannot be ascribed 
to Wurzel's erroneous argumentation; there seem to be deeper, more 
substantial reasons at work. One possible explanation of this conclu-
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sion and a radically new approach to the problem of German affri-
cates was provided in Prinz & Wiese (1991). Rákosi (2014) will be 
devoted to the reconstruction of its argumentation structure. 
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